The Battle on the Litani: June 1179
The
Battle on the Litani has not received much attention in the history of
the crusader states. It is often completely ignored or acknowledged with
no more than a passing mention. While it is true that this battle was
only one in a series of indecisive engagements between Salah ad-Din and
the forces of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the decade before the disaster
at Hattin in July 1187, it was a sad precursor of things to come and is
not entirely uninteresting.
The
battle was allegedly provoked by Saracen “raiding,” of cattle and crops
in the lordships of Beirut and Sidon. However, it seems highly unlikely
that the King of Jerusalem would personally respond to mere raiding,
particularly if it was conducted by Bedouins as some accounts suggest.
Certainly, accounts of the engagement make clear that both Farukh Shah, a
nephew of Salah ad-Din, and the Sultan himself were on hand with large
cavalry, but notably no infantry, forces. This smells far more like a
“reconnaissance in force” similar to the raid of 1187 that led to the
disaster at the Springs of Cresson.
In
any case, King Baldwin IV, now aged 18, responded by mustering a
powerful cavalry force of his own. This included not only his most
important baron, Raymond, Count of Tripoli, as well as Baldwin, Lord of
Ramla and Mirabel, but also the Templars under their Grand Master, Odo
de St. Amand. As W. B. Bartlett astutely points out in his Downfall of the Crusader Kingdom,
this composition of forces underlines the fact that the Kingdom was not
divided at this time; the Templars and Tripoli fought together without
suspicion or recriminations.
While
the exact sequence of events is not clear, it appears that the King and
his forces succeeded in surprising and routing the forces of Farukh
Shah. They drove the bulk of his cavalry back across the Litani and may
have temporarily taken Farukh Shah himself captive. Meanwhile, however,
the Templars had separately encountered the larger, main force under
Sultan Salah ad-Din. William of Tyre, who was not in the Kingdom at the
time and based his account on reports of others, blamed the Templars for
attacking this larger force injudiciously. While that is possible, it
should also be remembered that Tyre was a consistent critic of the
Templars and inclined to think poorly of them regardless, while other
participants may have been only too ready to pin the blame on someone
other than themselves.
What
is clear is that the Templars broke and fled back toward the main
feudal army around the King. At this point in time, however, the feudal
army was already scattered across the valley floor “mopping up” after
their successful action against Farukh Shah. They were in no position to
form a cohesive force. Salah ad-Din’s cavalry, hot on the heels of the
Templars, fell upon the dispersed Christian forces, killing and
capturing large numbers of Christian knights and nobles, including
Baldwin, Baron of Ramla and Mirabel, Hugh of Tiberius, and, according to Arab sources, some 270 knights and nobles altogether.
The
King’s household, however, rallied around him and extricated him from
the field with help and reinforcements from Reginald of Sidon. This was,
of course, vital, as his capture would have had even more serious
consequences than the other losses incurred. But his escape is notable
for another reason as well: Baldwin was unhorsed during the — evidently
heated — engagement, but his leprosy had by this stage advanced so far
that he no longer had the use of his hand and arms and was unable to
remount. The King had to be carried off the field on the back of a
Frankish knight.
Just
two months earlier, in another skirmish with Saracen cavalry, King
Baldwin’s horse had bolted and, without the use of his hands, he had
been unable to regain control. Now, because he was unable to remount, he
had come within a hair’s breadth of capture. The eighteen-year-old
king, who just two years earlier had led his chivalry to a stunning
victory over Salah ad-Din at Montgisard, was now forced to face the fact
that he could no longer command his armies from horseback. In a society
in which the mounted warrior, the knight, was the incarnation of manly
virtue and prowess, it must have broken Baldwin’s heart. Not that he
surrendered to his disability entirely: in the future he would lead his
armies from a litter.
Meanwhile,
the sorry outcome of this obscure engagement had two additional
detrimental consequences for the Kingdom of Jerusalem. First, among the
captives was the Templar Grand Master, Odo St. Amand. Whether he was to
blame for an unnecessary defeat, as William of Tyre suggests, or not,
he had the courage and honor (as his successor Gerard de Rideford did
not ) to refuse ransom in accordance with the Templar Rule. He died
miserably in a Saracen dungeon — thereby paving the way, indirectly, for
the election of the disastrous and unscrupulous Gerard de Rideford.
Equally
wide-reaching in its effect was the capture of Baldwin, Baron of Ramla
and Mirabel. Baldwin (often referred to as Baldwin of Ibelin because he
was the son of the First Baron of Ibelin and older brother of Balian of
Ibelin, the founder of the Ibelin dynasty) was considered such a
valuable prisoner that Salah ad-Din set his ransom higher than the
ransom once asked for King Baldwin II of Jerusalem; in short, the
Saracen Sultan demanded “a king’s ransom” for a baron whose feudal
holdings were only two thirds of that of the upper tier of barons
(Tripoli, Caesarea, Sidon, Galilee, Jaffa-Ascalon).
This is not logical — unless the Sultan had some reason to believe that Ramla was destined to become a king. According to the chronicler Ernoul, who had close ties to the Ibelin family and so can be considered an “insider” — Princess Sibylla of Jerusalem had at this time promised to marry Ramla. Such a marriage would have made Ramla the effective heir to the throne, and Salah ad-Din would have had every reason to both demand the high ransom and hope that the cost of paying it would discredit Ramla to his future subjects. Curiously, the ransom was paid not by the treasury of Jerusalem but by the Byzantine Emperor instead, suggesting that the latter too had reason to expect Ramla would become King of Jerusalem. Both Salah ad-Din and Emperor Manuel I appear to have been misinformed. That, or — as Ernoul suggests — Princess Sibylla changed her mind after Ramla was captured.
This is not logical — unless the Sultan had some reason to believe that Ramla was destined to become a king. According to the chronicler Ernoul, who had close ties to the Ibelin family and so can be considered an “insider” — Princess Sibylla of Jerusalem had at this time promised to marry Ramla. Such a marriage would have made Ramla the effective heir to the throne, and Salah ad-Din would have had every reason to both demand the high ransom and hope that the cost of paying it would discredit Ramla to his future subjects. Curiously, the ransom was paid not by the treasury of Jerusalem but by the Byzantine Emperor instead, suggesting that the latter too had reason to expect Ramla would become King of Jerusalem. Both Salah ad-Din and Emperor Manuel I appear to have been misinformed. That, or — as Ernoul suggests — Princess Sibylla changed her mind after Ramla was captured.
