'Through the sin of our first parents, all the powers
of the soul are left destitute of their proper order, whereby they are
naturally directed to virtue. This destitution is called a wounding of
nature.
First, in so far as the reason, where prudence resides, is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance.
Second, in so far as the will is deprived of its order to the good, there is the wound of malice.
Third, in so far as the sensitive appetite is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness.
Fourth, in so far as it is deprived of its order to the delectable moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.
These four wounds, ignorance, malice, weakness and concupiscence are afflicted on the whole of human nature only as a result of our first parents' sin. But since the inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of actual sin, these four wounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult, and concupiscence more impetuous.'
First, in so far as the reason, where prudence resides, is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance.
Second, in so far as the will is deprived of its order to the good, there is the wound of malice.
Third, in so far as the sensitive appetite is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness.
Fourth, in so far as it is deprived of its order to the delectable moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.
These four wounds, ignorance, malice, weakness and concupiscence are afflicted on the whole of human nature only as a result of our first parents' sin. But since the inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of actual sin, these four wounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult, and concupiscence more impetuous.'