WW3 BUILDUP: Russia To Send Advanced Anti-Aircraft Missiles To Syria, Warns Israel Of “Catastrophic Consequences”
On Tuesday Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman said in unambiguous terms that his country would attack such missile sites should Russia move forward on supplying them.
Liberman told Israel’s YNet, “What’s important to us is that the defensive weapons the Russians are giving Syria won’t be used against us,” and threatened further, “one thing should be clear: If someone fires on our planes, we will destroy them.”
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has in the past years of war in Syria – of which Israel is a significant player, especially given its longtime support of al-Qaeda linked anti-Assad insurgents to the south of Damascus – made it clear that transfer of the S-300 would constitute a “red line” on which Israel would act.
In 2013, when Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly first
considered the move, marking a major and exceptionally advanced update
to Syria’s current Soviet-era deterrent systems, Netanyahu warned, “We’ll destroy your missiles if you deliver them to Assad.” He said that Israel would hit them before the system came online.
Though displaying an early reluctance to derail its delicate
diplomatic relationship with Israel, Russia changed its tune on the very
morning after the US-led coalition strike took place overnight on April
13. Russia’s first deputy chief of staff, Sergei Rudskoi, said at the
time that Russia would “reconsider” whether to supply the air defenses to Assad – an issue previously thought dead as a result of prior Israeli-Russian summits in Sochi.
However, multiple international reports now indicate Russia is likely moving forward with transfer of the feared system which has a range of up to 150-200 kilometers (or 120 miles max).
Reuters reports while citing Russia’s main state operated news agency:
But what’s really behind Israel’s dire warnings to the world and longtime threats of acting on “red lines”? It is certainly not out of concern for acts of aggression coming from either Syria or Russia, as neither country has attacked Israel in recent history.
Instead, we find the opposite: Israel has attacked Russian allied Syria frequently and with impunity since at least 2013, and it simply wishes to maintain aerial superiority unimpeded (and going back to 2007, when it struck a suspected Syrian nuclear reactor near Deir Ezzor, as Israeli officials have recently admitted).
Last summer, the head of Israel’s air force for the first time openly acknowledged nearly one hundred IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) attacks on convoys and sites inside Syria over the course of the past 5 years. Perhaps a dozen more have occurred since then, with Syria only very recently retaliating against Israeli incursions, shooting down at least one Israeli F-16 jet near the Golan. Israel also reportedly participated in the US-led missile strikes on April 13 in the hope of weakening the Syrian Army’s clear dominant trajectory over the armed insurgency.
Indeed, in spite of over a hundred unprovoked Israeli attacks, Assad has not taken the bait of an Israeli desire for escalation for years now. While pro-government Syrians have themselves at times complained about Israel’s seeming ability to strike inside sovereign Syrian territory with impunity, Assad appears to be operating with the long-game in mind of “survival now, retaliation later”.
It was clear starting in 2013 that Israel’s semi-frequent strikes on largely non-strategic targets were more about provocation: should Damascus lob missiles back in Israel’s direction Netanyahu would launch an all-out assault while Syria was at its weakest in the midst of a grinding and externally funded al-Qaeda insurgency.
Concerning Syria’s current missile defense deterrent capabilities – though contested among analysts – Syria’s over 30-year old current deterrent system appears to have performed well, likely stunning the West and neighboring Israel (which itself played a part in the coalition attack) as it reportedly shot down 71 of the 103 cruise missiles, according to official Russian and Syrian government sources (Russia this week has offered proof that its version is correct, over and against Pentagon claims that not a single tomahawk was shot down).
Israeli military analysts are now themselves quite open about the end-goal here: it is all about Israel’s aim of maintaining the capability to do whatever it wants in Syria, without repercussions – whether international censure or domestic push-back against the Likud establishment.
One can look no further than “the centrist” Jerusalem Post, whose Deputy Managing Editor Tovah Lazaroff is unusually candid regarding Israeli aims while citing an Israeli general:
After Trump’s ‘one-off’ attack on Syria and Russia’s non-engagement against what was in the end a big American fireworks show, many around the world breathed a collective sigh of relief that World War III had been avoided… but are we only witnessing a mere prelude to the final act?
SOURCE
Still, given the long history of North Korea’s double-dealing, outright lying and surreptitious construction of weapons of mass destruction, the likelihood of Kim actually surrendering his nuclear weapons is extremely low, no matter what he says publicly.
And what makes it so worrisome is not only the handful of nuclear weapons in the hands of a dictator who may be able to lob a few to Honolulu or even to Seattle. We also need to consider North Korea’s ability to deploy one or two nuclear weapons at altitude over the continental U.S. in order to create a devastating burst of energy called an electromagnetic pulse.
While the science of EMP’s is not fully settled — largely because it is impossible to test on a grand scale — there is plenty of credible evidence that they constitute a real threat, especially in the context of North Korea.
The short burst of vastly powerful electrical and magnetic shocks
involved in an EMP could potentially devastate everything from your
iPhone to the entire U.S. power grid. Imagine thousands of lightning
strikes hitting every home and business in America.
Bursts from a high altitude nuclear weapon — or a major solar event, by the way — could start by producing a so-called E1 shock, a brief pulse that is particularly devastating to what are known as supervisory control and data acquisition systems. The developed world is dependent on these Scada systems, which include manufacturing facilities, water-treatment plants, HVAC systems and many other things we take for granted.
Immediately after the E1 would follow an E2 burst, which is of lesser magnitude and may last as little as a microsecond. Yet these pulses are still able to cause significant damage, in large part because many protection systems will have been wiped out by the E1.
Finally, a longer E3 pulse could last several minutes and attack long-line systems such as the electric power grid by destroying substations across the nation. E1 and E3 are the effects of greatest concern because we are the least hardened against them. Together, they could deprive large parts of the country of electricity for weeks, months or even a year or two.
How likely are these scenarios? The idea of either a terrorist group or a rogue state using a high-altitude EMP burst has been seriously examined by scientific and government groups; but there is no agreement on the potential size of the effect.
Some analysts insist an EMP would not be as apocalyptic as described in the widely referenced 2011 dystopian novel, “One Second After,” which portrays an America brought to its knees by such a strike. Others contend that it’s highly unlikely that any hostile power would attempt one, given the overwhelming U.S. nuclear counterstrike that would quickly follow.
Maybe the skeptics are right. But given the potential devastating consequences of an EMP, can we really take the chance? That the North Koreans are probably very close to developing this capability — if they aren’t there already — is all the more reason to work hard at the negotiating table.
Still, even as talks progress, there are military options the U.S. can take simultaneously for a higher level of defense.
First and foremost, we can harden our key systems, beginning with intercontinental ballistic missiles and other nuclear strategic weapons. Next comes vital infrastructure — the electric grid, water supplies, transportation systems, financial and medical networks, and so on. The cost would run to the billions — but probably not the trillions. And it would make us safer not only against rogue nuclear strikes but also EMP effects from huge solar storms, which occur on a regular basis every century or two.
Second, the military needs to increase its ballistic missile defenses against the “single shot” attack that would use EMP. This could include more ground-based interceptors to knock down attacks over the North Pole — a route that North Korea or Iran could attempt. The Navy should plan how it would position its destroyers and cruisers equipped with Aegis combat systems off our coasts in times of rising tension.
Third, the U.S. should be pursuing a variety of advanced systems that can counter long-range missiles through non-kinetic means: lasers (which can be deployed on aircraft or from space); cyber systems that can disable enemy missiles in pre-launch and possibly while airborne; and electronic jamming that can counter cruise missile variants of EMP systems.
Finally, we need to focus more intently on intelligence and early warning systems, primarily based in space, that can detect the movement of launch systems, indications of pre-launch activity, a launch itself, and then track incoming threats. Part of this involves stitching together the various components of the “detect-to-kill chain” in an overarching system that itself is hardened against a pre-emptive cyber attack.
We can all hope that the coming spring brings a thaw to U.S.-North Korean relations. But one swallow does not a spring make, as the saying goes — Americans need to be ready for another winter of confrontation if diplomacy does not succeed, and being prepared for EMP is a vital part of doing so.
James Stavridis is a Bloomberg columnist. He is a retired U.S. Navy admiral and former military commander of NATO, and dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His most recent book is “Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the World’s Oceans.”
Liberman told Israel’s YNet, “What’s important to us is that the defensive weapons the Russians are giving Syria won’t be used against us,” and threatened further, “one thing should be clear: If someone fires on our planes, we will destroy them.”
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has in the past years of war in Syria – of which Israel is a significant player, especially given its longtime support of al-Qaeda linked anti-Assad insurgents to the south of Damascus – made it clear that transfer of the S-300 would constitute a “red line” on which Israel would act.
However, multiple international reports now indicate Russia is likely moving forward with transfer of the feared system which has a range of up to 150-200 kilometers (or 120 miles max).
Reuters reports while citing Russia’s main state operated news agency:
Russia plans to deliver new air defense systems to Syria in the near future, RIA news agency cited Russia’s Defence Ministry as saying on Wednesday.And crucially, as Haaretz notes, “With Putin’s S-300, Assad’s army could even ‘lock-on’ IAF aircraft as they take off from bases within Israel.” And as one Israeli defense analyst put it, “Israel should be worried.
The ministry added it plans to study a U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile captured by Syrian forces in a recent attack, in order to improve Russia’s own missiles, RIA reported.
But what’s really behind Israel’s dire warnings to the world and longtime threats of acting on “red lines”? It is certainly not out of concern for acts of aggression coming from either Syria or Russia, as neither country has attacked Israel in recent history.
Instead, we find the opposite: Israel has attacked Russian allied Syria frequently and with impunity since at least 2013, and it simply wishes to maintain aerial superiority unimpeded (and going back to 2007, when it struck a suspected Syrian nuclear reactor near Deir Ezzor, as Israeli officials have recently admitted).
Last summer, the head of Israel’s air force for the first time openly acknowledged nearly one hundred IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) attacks on convoys and sites inside Syria over the course of the past 5 years. Perhaps a dozen more have occurred since then, with Syria only very recently retaliating against Israeli incursions, shooting down at least one Israeli F-16 jet near the Golan. Israel also reportedly participated in the US-led missile strikes on April 13 in the hope of weakening the Syrian Army’s clear dominant trajectory over the armed insurgency.
Indeed, in spite of over a hundred unprovoked Israeli attacks, Assad has not taken the bait of an Israeli desire for escalation for years now. While pro-government Syrians have themselves at times complained about Israel’s seeming ability to strike inside sovereign Syrian territory with impunity, Assad appears to be operating with the long-game in mind of “survival now, retaliation later”.
It was clear starting in 2013 that Israel’s semi-frequent strikes on largely non-strategic targets were more about provocation: should Damascus lob missiles back in Israel’s direction Netanyahu would launch an all-out assault while Syria was at its weakest in the midst of a grinding and externally funded al-Qaeda insurgency.
Concerning Syria’s current missile defense deterrent capabilities – though contested among analysts – Syria’s over 30-year old current deterrent system appears to have performed well, likely stunning the West and neighboring Israel (which itself played a part in the coalition attack) as it reportedly shot down 71 of the 103 cruise missiles, according to official Russian and Syrian government sources (Russia this week has offered proof that its version is correct, over and against Pentagon claims that not a single tomahawk was shot down).
Israeli military analysts are now themselves quite open about the end-goal here: it is all about Israel’s aim of maintaining the capability to do whatever it wants in Syria, without repercussions – whether international censure or domestic push-back against the Likud establishment.
One can look no further than “the centrist” Jerusalem Post, whose Deputy Managing Editor Tovah Lazaroff is unusually candid regarding Israeli aims while citing an Israeli general:
Israel fears the S-300 would hamper its ability to attack military sites in Syria that are dangerous to the Jewish State and would therefore allow Iran to strengthen its military foothold in that country.Meanwhile, Russian military sources were quoted in Haaretz as saying that if Israel tried to destroy the anti-aircraft batteries—as analysts have indicated Israel likely would—it would leads to “catastrophic consequences.”
“This is by far the most advanced weapons system in air defense in Syrian hands so far,” said Brig. Gen. Assaf Orion (ret.), “so theoretically it is an entrenchment to the apparent freedom of action that the Israeli air force enjoys over Syria’s sky.”
After Trump’s ‘one-off’ attack on Syria and Russia’s non-engagement against what was in the end a big American fireworks show, many around the world breathed a collective sigh of relief that World War III had been avoided… but are we only witnessing a mere prelude to the final act?
SOURCE
Former Admiral: Can North Korea Launch an Electromagnetic Storm?
The diplomatic circuit is awash in optimism as the proposed summit between North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un and President Donald Trump draws near. Indeed, Trump is right to go to the table with the North Koreans and negotiate for full denuclearization.Still, given the long history of North Korea’s double-dealing, outright lying and surreptitious construction of weapons of mass destruction, the likelihood of Kim actually surrendering his nuclear weapons is extremely low, no matter what he says publicly.
And what makes it so worrisome is not only the handful of nuclear weapons in the hands of a dictator who may be able to lob a few to Honolulu or even to Seattle. We also need to consider North Korea’s ability to deploy one or two nuclear weapons at altitude over the continental U.S. in order to create a devastating burst of energy called an electromagnetic pulse.
While the science of EMP’s is not fully settled — largely because it is impossible to test on a grand scale — there is plenty of credible evidence that they constitute a real threat, especially in the context of North Korea.
Bursts from a high altitude nuclear weapon — or a major solar event, by the way — could start by producing a so-called E1 shock, a brief pulse that is particularly devastating to what are known as supervisory control and data acquisition systems. The developed world is dependent on these Scada systems, which include manufacturing facilities, water-treatment plants, HVAC systems and many other things we take for granted.
Immediately after the E1 would follow an E2 burst, which is of lesser magnitude and may last as little as a microsecond. Yet these pulses are still able to cause significant damage, in large part because many protection systems will have been wiped out by the E1.
Finally, a longer E3 pulse could last several minutes and attack long-line systems such as the electric power grid by destroying substations across the nation. E1 and E3 are the effects of greatest concern because we are the least hardened against them. Together, they could deprive large parts of the country of electricity for weeks, months or even a year or two.
How likely are these scenarios? The idea of either a terrorist group or a rogue state using a high-altitude EMP burst has been seriously examined by scientific and government groups; but there is no agreement on the potential size of the effect.
Some analysts insist an EMP would not be as apocalyptic as described in the widely referenced 2011 dystopian novel, “One Second After,” which portrays an America brought to its knees by such a strike. Others contend that it’s highly unlikely that any hostile power would attempt one, given the overwhelming U.S. nuclear counterstrike that would quickly follow.
Maybe the skeptics are right. But given the potential devastating consequences of an EMP, can we really take the chance? That the North Koreans are probably very close to developing this capability — if they aren’t there already — is all the more reason to work hard at the negotiating table.
Still, even as talks progress, there are military options the U.S. can take simultaneously for a higher level of defense.
First and foremost, we can harden our key systems, beginning with intercontinental ballistic missiles and other nuclear strategic weapons. Next comes vital infrastructure — the electric grid, water supplies, transportation systems, financial and medical networks, and so on. The cost would run to the billions — but probably not the trillions. And it would make us safer not only against rogue nuclear strikes but also EMP effects from huge solar storms, which occur on a regular basis every century or two.
Second, the military needs to increase its ballistic missile defenses against the “single shot” attack that would use EMP. This could include more ground-based interceptors to knock down attacks over the North Pole — a route that North Korea or Iran could attempt. The Navy should plan how it would position its destroyers and cruisers equipped with Aegis combat systems off our coasts in times of rising tension.
Third, the U.S. should be pursuing a variety of advanced systems that can counter long-range missiles through non-kinetic means: lasers (which can be deployed on aircraft or from space); cyber systems that can disable enemy missiles in pre-launch and possibly while airborne; and electronic jamming that can counter cruise missile variants of EMP systems.
Finally, we need to focus more intently on intelligence and early warning systems, primarily based in space, that can detect the movement of launch systems, indications of pre-launch activity, a launch itself, and then track incoming threats. Part of this involves stitching together the various components of the “detect-to-kill chain” in an overarching system that itself is hardened against a pre-emptive cyber attack.
We can all hope that the coming spring brings a thaw to U.S.-North Korean relations. But one swallow does not a spring make, as the saying goes — Americans need to be ready for another winter of confrontation if diplomacy does not succeed, and being prepared for EMP is a vital part of doing so.
James Stavridis is a Bloomberg columnist. He is a retired U.S. Navy admiral and former military commander of NATO, and dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His most recent book is “Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the World’s Oceans.”
